V. In Sleep a King by Piper, William Bowman
CHAPTER V 
IN SLEEP A KING 
The couplet that concludes Sonnet 87, "Thus have I had thee as a 
dream doth flatter- / In sleep a king, but waking no such matter," was 
singled out for approval by W. H.  Auden,' And the figure of the dream as a 
false courtier, telling the poet that he was everything, followed by the bleak 
awakening to reality, is unquestionably fine. But to understand the 
relevance of this couplet to  the whole sonnet and thus to feel its full weight, 
one must understand a king's power-or what the Elizabethans called his 
royal prerogative. 
"Questions of the king's power in Tudor England tended," G. R. 
Elton has explained, '20 resolve themselves into the question of his relation 
to the law."' "In warre time, and in the field," wrote the Tudor statesman 
and scholar Sir Thomas Smith, the king exercises "absolute power, so that 
his worde is a law." "The prince useth also absolute power," Smith con- 
tinued, "in crying and decreeing the money of the realm by his 
proclamation only." He then listed as a third prerogative that which is 
chiefly relevant to Sonnet 87: "the prince useth also to dispense with lawes 
made, whereas equitie requireth a moderation to be had, and with paynes 
for transgression of laws, where the payne of the lawe is applyed onely to 
the prince."' This personal exemption enjoyed by the king was detailed by 
William Stanford, another Tudor scholar: "the laws do attribute unto him 
all honour, dignity, prerogative and preeminence, which prerogative doth 
not only extend to his own person but also to all other his possessions, 
goods and chattels. As that his person shall be subject to no man's suit, his 
possessions cannot be taken from him by any violence or wrongful disseisin, 
his goods and chattels are under no tribute, toll nor custom, nor otherwise 
di~trainable."~ The conduct of King Lear shows that Shakespeare under- 
stood these unique royal prerogatives. When Lear enters to  the blind 
Gloucester, he begins: "No, they cannot touch me for coining; / I am the 
king himself." He then exercises his absolute power over military affairs 
and, more especially, his right to impress soldiers: "There's your press 
money." It was this prerogative, we may recall, that Falstaff abused when 
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he was acting as King Henry's agent. The prerogative Lear is chiefly con- 
cerned with, however, that which accompanies his mad effort to prove 
himself "every inch a king," is the right, on behalf of equity, to  set aside 
individual legal judgments. He pardons one man's life in a "cause" of 
adultery; releases a whore from the whipping stake; and, after a survey of 
the law's subjection to influence, decrees, "None does offend, none-I 
say! 1'11 able 'em." 
The limits of royal prerogative during Shakespeare's life cannot be 
precisely defined. Queen Elizabeth, who enjoyed a greater and a more 
reliable power than her successor, claimed less and, what is probably more 
important, asserted her claim in a manner both equivocal and ingratiating: 
"I trust by the almighty power of God, I still shall be his instrument to 
preserve you . . . And though God hath raised me high, yet this I count the 
glory of my crown, that I have reigned with your 10ves."~ James, who was a 
stricter scholar but a less clever politician, spoke more positively and 
dogmatically: "As for the absolute prerogative of the Crown, that is no 
subject for the tongue of a lawyer, nor is lawful to be d i~puted ."~  The En- 
glish actually denied that the king was above the law when that question 
forced itself upon them: Richard Hooker insisted in 1590, "Lex facit 
regem";' and John Cowell7s assertion in The Interpreter of 1607 that the 
king was "above the law by his absolute power" was fiercely repudiated by 
the House of  common^.^ Nevertheless, during the period when Shake- 
speare must have composed Sonnet 87, an English monarch enjoyed as his 
prerogative a personal exemption from legal action, and he possessed the 
right, "whereas equitie requireth a moderation," to exempt from the 
constraints of institutional legality other individual persons as well. 
The first twelve lines of 87 are developed, as has been widely recog- 
nized, in legal diction: 
Farewell! thou art too dear for my possessing, 
And like enough thou know'st thy estimate. 
The charter of thy worth gives thee releasing; 
My bonds in thee are all determinate. 
For how do I hold thee but by thy granting, 
And for that riches where is my deserving? 
The cause of this fair gift in me is wanting, 
And so my patent back again is swerving. 
Thyself thougav'st, thy own worth then not knowing, 
Or me, to whom thou gav'st it, elsemistaking; 
So thy great gift, upon misprision growing, 
Comes home again, on better judgment making. 
Throughout the poem Shakespeare has equated the loss of his friend or, 
more precisely, the failure of their relationship with the cancellation of a 
contract. This means, of course, that, as one reads it, he must consider the 
adequacy of such an institutional practice to explain and to accommodate 
IN SLEEP A KING 65 
the rights and the loyalties of personal affection. 
The impression of a legal sensibility and of legal proprieties especially 
pervades the first two quatrains. In the first one there are such insistently 
contractual terms as "charter," "bonds," and "determinate";9 and these 
infect "possessing," "estimate," and "releasing." Since all these terms 
relate to the laws of property, moreover, "dear" and "worth" assume 
financial, materialistic values. The first line of the poem, we should notice, 
begins as a paradox: how could a friend be "too dear," that is, too beloved, 
to be held in one's continuing affection? Understanding "dear" to mean 
expensive, however, and interpreting "possessing" as legal seisin, one 
understands the matter very well: something might easily be too costly for 
the poet to own. The second quatrain maintains the equation between love 
and law, presenting the reader with more terms obviousIy suggestive of the 
rights of property, such as "patent," "riches," and "granting"; and, by 
the use of these, filling "hold," "gift," and "cause" with similarly 
legalistic implications. The first quatrain pronounced the state of the 
"bonds" of affection between the poet and his friend as "determinate"; the 
second, as its first word indicates, presents the grounds of this deter- 
mination. Line 5 explains the poet's rights over the friend as a form of 
feudal tenure: his "hold" is not fee-simple, but a lease granted by his lord. 
The next lines ask the basis of this grant; deny that there is a sufficient basis; 
and-"som-make the judgment that the grant, although it may have the 
dignity of a "patent," must revert, Every line in these two quatrains defines 
a separate statement, a single independent clause; and this formal stiffness 
of organization reinforces the persistent legalistic stiffness of the argument. 
The third quatrain has terms of a legal and contractual force, as the 
first two did: it repeats two words, "worth," and "gift," which the legal 
context has already influenced; and it introduces "misprision" and 
"judgment." This quatrain does not show the steadiness of movement, 
however, nor the firmness of utterance that prevailed in the first two. 
Although each line-pair contains its own independent statement, each one 
presents a distinct movement and a movement which, in both cases, pre- 
sents special problems and uncertainties. The first statement is defined in 
the first half-line and then extensively modified, whereas the subject and the 
predicate of the second, both of which are embedded in modification, are 
deployed in separate lines. The participle phrase defined by line 10 opposes 
the phrase confined to the second half of line 9: both this opposition itself 
and the imbalance of its organization bring uncertainty into the poem. And 
what is here opposed, of course, is alternative errors. The statement that the 
friend has made some kind of error in judgment is extended, moreover, by 
the suggestion of an error in conduct: he may have mis-taken the poet, that 
is, he may have grasped the poet's affection under false pretenses. The 
meaning of lines 11 and 12 is still more slippery. The phrase, "upon 
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misprision growing," can go either backward with "thy great gift," 
modifying "gift" as an adjectival phrase, or forward with "Comes home 
again," adverbially modifying "Comes." And the nature of this growth is, 
accordingly, problematical. If the phrase, "upon misprision growing" is 
considered an inversion, then the "gift" must be understood to have taken 
root in "misprision," in error. The impression that this event is past, which 
the preceding line-pair promotes, enforces this meaning, which would, of 
course, make the friend's present action seem just. If one takes the phrase 
as it comes, however, considering the event it describes to be present, 
"misprision" is the growth, which is now rooted in the friend, and his pres- 
ent action must be condemned. No matter how this ambiguity is deter- 
mined, "growing" resists the legaI equation that has been imposed on the 
present failure of personal affection. 
The last half-line of the third quatrain, however, reimposes this legal 
equation, which has been, as we just saw, under serious human and per- 
sonal pressure. The present "judgment" cancels the former "misprision," 
opposing this term in sense while enforcing its tone; and the legal deter- 
mination of the relationship, because of this final suppression of all per- 
sonal considerations, seems at the end of the third quatrain to have been 
firmly established. 
Although the term "judgment," as it is used here, probably carries 
enough weight to assure a modern reader's recognition of this effect, that is, 
the final clamping of legal procedures upon the poet's personal affection, it 
would have impressed an even greater and more precisely focused legality 
upon an Elizabethan mind. The word "judgment," as Mark Edwin An- 
drews has pointed out, stood in sixteenth century England for a legal verdict 
handed down by a court of common law.'' As George Spence has explained 
in The Equitable Jurisdiction of the Court of Chancery, "The judgments of 
the common law, following the writ on which the action was founded, were 
uniform, simple and invariable, according to  the nature of the action."" 
Another legal historian, the famous Holdsworth, has explained, further, 
that in handing down their judgments, "the common law courts . . . simply 
decided the specific issue raised by the pleadings."12 The chancery courts, 
whose concern was not "law" but "equity," opposed the rigid legalism of 
these judgments at law. "In equity," Holdsworth points out, "the court 
considered the whole circumstances of the case made by the bill and answer, 
and tried to make a decree which wouId give effect to the rights of a11 the 
parties according to the circumstances."" Andrews has argued at length 
that The Merchant of Venice is a fictional argument in favor of equity. As 
he has explained, Englishmen were deeply concerned during the 1590s by 
the conflicting claims of the courts of chancery, which handed down 
"decrees in personam" and the courts of common law, which made 
"judgments in rern."14 In The Merchant of Venice when Shylock 
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proclaims, "I stand here for the law," and calls again and again for a 
"judgment," Shakespeare could confidently expect his audience, Andrews 
argues, to  recall the rigidities of strictly legal verdicts and their individual 
inequities. The term "judgment" also carries such weight in Sonnet 87. 
The strictly legal disposition of human affairs, for which "judgment" 
stands, aIthough persistently evident in this poem and finally presented as 
triumphant, has been continuously subjected to pressure from personal 
factors, from factors of the kind, that is, that would be relevant to the 
achievement of equity. This pressure, which we have already acknowledged 
in the third quatrain, is also implicitly present in the first two. The paradox 
in line 1 implies the force and scope of personal affection: its point, 
which the reader modifies only in retrospect, is, surely, that no friend can be 
"too dear," too beloved. Line 2, although it provides the legal, the con- 
tractual, frame of reference by which one corrects the paradox in line 1, also 
enforces the claim of personal feeling-although in a different way: the 
tone of the expletival "like enough" is not absolutely definable, but it 
evidently suggests some personal reproach, especially since that which it is 
"like enough" that the friend knows is his own "estimate." This line, then, 
adds some personal emotions, if not those of affection, to the present cause 
and prompts the reader to recognize that, despite the legal motives at- 
tributed to the friend and sanctioned by the poet, this is not a strictly legal 
matter. The second quatrain maintains the personal nature of the case, 
thrusting that, indeed, as a recalcitrant fact into the legal workings. What 
are the "riches" the poet has held on grant from this estimable lord? Not a 
tract of land nor a pension, but "thee." This is such a grant as no prince 
ever granted before. It was, rather, the vassal, whose tenure was granted 
him from above, who pledged himself. But, of course, the vassal's pledge of 
personal allegiance could not be described as a grant. The term "wanting" 
in line 7 resists the procedures of law in a different way. Its primary 
meaning, lacking, suits the indicated legalities: the poet Iacks grounds for a 
cause against the friend. But since "wanting" sometimes means needing 
and sometimes desiring, this term does suggest valid personal claims the 
poet might raise: there are other causes besides a narrowly contractual 
cause. "Swerving," finally, seems usually to have indicated a deviance from 
the right in Shakespeare's usage-we may recall Antony's "most unnoble 
swerving," for example. And in the first two quatrains Shakespeare has 
given a number of reasons for us at least to  entertain such an interpretation 
of the friend's present procedure. 
The three quatrains of 87 present a legal determination of a case of 
love, a "judgment," which ignores the rights of affection and the claims of 
personal loyalty. In stating this case, however, it variously implies a need 
for a more complete and a more human consideration, for what the 
Elizabethans called "equity." Equity, as we have seen, is the domain, first, 
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of the courts of chancery and, second, of the king. Actually, equity resided 
in the king, and chancery was merely his agency,Is Equity, as Andrews 
would interpret Shakespeare's full meaning in the Merchant, is "mightiest 
in the mightiest," 
it becomes 
The throned monarch better than his crown. 
His sceptre shows the force of temporal power, 
The attribute to awe and majesty, 
Wherein doth sit the dread and fear of kings; 
But [equity] is above this sceptred sway, 
It is enthroned in the hearts of kings." 
By the time we reach the couplet of 87, we have been made to feel the 
relevance, the need, of such a kingly combination of heart and power. The 
imminence of its appearance, moreover, has been subtly indicated-chiefly 
by the terms "charter" and "patent." For the king, who was the peak of 
the legal and political pyramid, the lord in whom all grants and all 
allegiance terminated, was the chief giver of such documents and such 
privileges, The reader may wonder which is the king, and which the subject. 
In the second quatrain, the friend apparently made the grant and issued the 
patent; but in the first, the charter, if not the bonds, had emerged from 
another source-from the poet? Nevertheless, by the time he reaches the 
couplet, the reader should be well aware of the need for one royal heart to 
consider the bonds of affection in a manner responsive, not merely to the 
produced proofs of estimation and worth, but also to human needs, 
commitments, and loyalties. 
What he finds, however, is only a flattering dream: a past that has 
faded like the visions of sleep; and leaves behind, not a royal decree of 
personal equity, but merely the "matter" at law that was described and 
established in the quatrains. The fading, insubstantial nature of  the kingly 
presence is underscored by the impossibility of identifying it: has the poet 
dreamed of having or of being a king? Has he himself briefly exercised 
kingly power, or has he fleetingly enjoyed his friend's generous use of 
kingly prerogative?'' This uncertainty, which should recall the same kind of 
uncertainty lurking in the quatrains, emphasizes the tenuity of the poet's 
dream and enforces the bitter reality, the waking truth, of rationalization 
and betrayaI. As the reader comprehends the inequity of this particular 
cause, however, he should recognize the universal eminence of personal 
prerogatives. 
Although Shakespeare used legal terminology in several other sonnets, 
he never again used it in as impressive or illuminating a way as in 87. Legal 
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language figures significantly only in the first two lines of 30 and in the 
second quatrain of 13. It permeates 4; but since it is apparently adequate to  
the argument (that the young man should marry and procreate), it provides 
at best a slight refinement of the case and at worst a slight distraction from 
it. The legal representation of the love triangle in 134 is positively 
detrimental, presenting an obviously imprecise version of the motivations 
of the friend, the mistress, and the lover, but a version that we have not 
been given any means to correct. In 46 the law has furnished an easy 
allegory, the poet representing his heart as the plaintiff and his eye as the 
defendant in a case that is pointless (as 47 immediately acknowledges) and, 
despite its Platonic trappings, quite trivial. 
The law is referred to with better effect in Sonnet 49: 
Against that time (if ever that time come) 
When I shall see thee frown on  my defects, 
Whenas thy love hath cast his utmost sum, 
Called to  that audit by advised respects; 
Against that time when thou shalt strangely pass 
And scarcely greet me with that sun, thine eye, 
When love, converted from the thing it was, 
Shall reasons find of settled gravity - 
Against that time d o  I ensconce me here 
Within the knowledge of mine own desert, 
And this my hand against myself uprear, 
To  guard the lawful reasons on  thy part. 
T o  leave poor me thou hast the strength of laws, 
Since why to  love I can allege no  cause. 
This is an elegant poem, but a slight one. It is conditional-"if ever that 
time comeH-throughout; and it is equivocal or, better perhaps, uncommit- 
ted in attitude until line 11. 
For ten lines the poet puts off taking a stand on a situation that, despite 
an increase in its apparent likelihood throughout the poem, may never arise. 
He has so completely refrained from betraying his own response to  this 
supposed situation in the first two quatrains, indeed, that he is able to 
describe a dramatic reversal of attitude in the third. Its first two lines rather 
strongly suggest an attitude of personal defense and wounded merit; but 11- 
12, in which the poet raises his hand against himself, indicate that, his "own 
desert" being small, he will, rather, if the need should arise, defend his 
friend. Such an attitude is certainly unusual, not to say extreme. But since 
the poet has assumed it quite voluntarily and done so, moreover, with such 
easy grace, it is apparently sincere. The sincerity of 49 is augmented by the 
nature of its diction and its figures. The institutional expressions-"ad- 
vised respects," "lawful reasons," "allege . . . causeu-are too sparse 
either to constitute a figurative tissue in themselves or to influence other 
terms. The impression of a legal sensibility, which hardly exists in the 
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second quatrain, is strongest in the couplet-too late for it to have any 
general effect. And even here it lacks the power that focused everything in 
87. The term "poor," for example, spans several meanings in- 
discriminately: impoverished, pitiable, unworthy. In order to entertain 
'cpoor7' as an element of this poem, the reader must comprehend all these 
meanings at once. 
This expressive diffuseness of 49 is owing not only to the sparseness of 
its legal terminology, but also to the presence of several other figurative 
strands. In quatrain three, for instance, "ensconce" introduces a military 
or, possibly, a constabulary suggestion. And this is extended by the image 
of the poet's uprearing his hand to guard his friend's lawful interests. The 
likening of the friend's eye to the sun and the repeated concern with his 
actual countenance and conduct further diffuse the figurative force of this 
poem. A couple of these descriptive phrases, "settled gravity" and 
"strangely pass," are beautifully expressive. The syntactic demotion of the 
friend from a substantive, stranger, to an adverb, strangely, makes him 
virtually dissolve or turn into a ghost before our eyes, a poetic effect that 
precisely expresses the living development the poet is here entertaining. But 
the very power of such incidental, such transient, effects assures the general 
diffuseness I am describing. Each figure, including those taken from 
business and law, has an immediate rather than a pervasive effect; and thus 
the impression of a mechanistic institution, of a universal procrustean bed, 
which pervades Sonnet 87, giving it its scope and its distinction, simply fails 
to develop in Sonnet 49. 
Sonnet 71, a poem not informed with legal terminology, nevertheless 
provides a more illuminating analogue to 87 than does 49; and it is also 
more nearly comparable to 87 in excellence. In 71, as in 87, Shakespeare has 
framed the question of personal affection and loyalty in a context not 
precisely suitable to it, in a context that proves, indeed, to be seriously 
inimical to personal concerns. The present context, however, is not the legal 
system but polite society or what the poet describes in the couplet as "the 
wise world." The stress between personal and social concerns has been, as I 
will try to show, very forcefully developed in 71, although not as forcefully, 
finally, as the analogous conflict in 87. 
No longer mourn for me when I am dead 
Than you shall hear the surly sullen bell 
Give warning to the world that I am fled 
From this vile world, with vilest worms to dwell. 
Nay, if you read this line, remember not 
The hand that writ it; for  I love you so 
That 1 in your sweet thoughts would be forgot 
If thinking on  me then should make you woe. 
0, if,  I say, you look upon this verse 
When I ,  perhaps, compounded am with clay, 
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Do not so much as my poor namerehearse, 
But let your love even with my life decay, 
Lest the wise world should look into your moan 
And mock you with me after I am gone. 
The poet advances two motives for his friend's ready forgetfulness: first, 
that remembrance might cause his friend "woe" 01. 6-9); and, second, that 
any sign of woe on the friend's part might cause him social embarrassment 
01. 13-14). The first motive is explicitly rooted in the poet's firm affection 
for the friend; the second is immediately preceded by the poet's suggestion 
that the friend's "love" for him is or ought to be subject to the shifting of 
circumstances. As the two loves are thus distinguished, the poet's surely 
firm and the friend's possibly alterable, so are the two explanations of the 
friend's oblivion. The emphasis obviously falls on the second explanation 
since that is focused in a couplet and since it concludes the argument; and 
this emphasis on the friend's embarrassment, rather than his woe, implies 
something about the friend's affection and his nature. 
In 71 as in 87, however, the poet seemingly approves the friend; indeed, 
he himself assumes a social attitude, an attitude of graceful diffidence 
toward himself, his love, and his death. His name he describes as a "poor 
name"; his poetry, as just one scribbled "line" or "verse" after the other; 
and his departure from Iife, as merely a modulation between degrees of vile- 
ness. The poet's assuming such an attitude toward himself naturally 
reinforces his insistence that the friend should not take his death too much 
to heart. The poet maintains this pose with the use of repetition, a practice 
that apparentIy transforms his statements into gestures. He employs paral- 
lel "if" clauses in the second and third quatrains; parallel "when" clauses 
in the first and third; and negative commands-"No longer mourn," 
'Lremember not," and "Do not . . . rehearsemain each of the three. 
Emphatic expletives, "Nay," "I say," and "so much as," enforce this 
practice of elegant revision and restatement. As the poem proceeds, there- 
fore, it presents us with a conflict between speech as assertion and speech as 
act; and, as the repetitions accumulate, resolves toward what we may call a 
speech-act equivalence. Or we may feel, simply, that the poet doth protest 
too much.18 The attitude of elegant and possibly insincere public in- 
souciance is enriched by a number of essentially social terms: by "mourn" 
-instead of "grieveM-which recalls less the anguished heart than the 
inky cloak; and by the personifying terms "surly sullen," constituting a 
virtual repetition in themselves, that give the bell a social rather than a 
religious countenance. We may also notice the substitution of "look upon" 
for "read" in the second "if" clause; the virtual repetition of this in- 
dication of graceful indifference, "look into," which leads in the couplet to 
the supposed "mock" with which the poem closes; and, finally, the term 
"rehearse" with its strongly theatrical associations. Thus, as in 87, the 
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diction indicates a milieu that stands in serious opposition to the personal 
feelings that the poem considers. 
Again as in 87, the personal concerns are pervasively evident. 
"Worms," even if .their special vileness is reduced to some parallel 
relationship with the conventional vileness of the world, resist the suggested 
social transformation of everything. It is hard to forget that "men have died 
from time to  time, and worms have [not dwelt with, but] eaten them." For 
all his diffidence toward his own death, the poet transposes "worms" into 
the superlative degree of vileness. The "clay," with which he will most 
likely be "compounded," may also remind the reader of an individual 
aspect of life toward which all social attitudes are inadequate. The personal 
realm is made explicit in the poet's first reason for his advice, especially in 
"love" and "woe," both of which dwell well beyond the uses or the 
benefits of society. And although the word "gone," which concludes the 
poem, gives a suitably polite disguise to the poet's fate, "dead," which 
stands at the end of the first line, acknowledges the reality. Thus the per- 
sonal realm, in which love and death collide, declares itself even as the poet 
anchors himself in society and draws on public attitudes for his loving 
advice. 
This conflict between the realm of love-and-death and that in which 
these personal realities provide cues for elegant or embarrassing attitudes 
receives an especially intense articulation in the third quatrain. The several 
expletives with which it is inflated suggest, as we have acknowledged, a pose 
of elegant relaxation, and thus augment its social surface. One of these 
terms, "perhaps," we may think of as softening the whole question of the 
poet's death and transforming his address into a game, a diverting exercise 
in let's pretend. On the other hand, this very term also intensifies the 
personal aspect of the poem. A colleague has suggested the presence of a 
vein of medieval Christian teaching and belief in this sonnet, evident in such 
terms as "bell," "worms," and "clay," that might allow "perhaps" to 
indicate the possibility that "I" may not be "compounded . . . with clay," 
but rather that "I" may be raised to dwell in heaven. The present im- 
plication of such a possibility, moreover, that is, our imaginative awareness 
of the poet's exalted spirit looking down upon the mean and craven conduct 
of his beloved friend, has an undeniable emotional appeal. But I do not, 
finally, find it in my experience of this poem. Sonnet 71 shares quite a few 
terms, admittedly, with such immediately relevant Christian materials as the 
orders for "The Visitation of the Sick" and "The Burial of the Dead" in 
Queen Elizabeth's Prayer Book of 1559-a book the contents of which 
Shakespeare must have known from childhood. But none of these shared 
terms, "dead," "decay," "dwell," "hand," "name," "rehearse," or 
"world," as used in 71 recalls those services or the Christian hope embodied 
in them. No expression in 71 has the suggestive force of the optative "Let 
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me not," which opens Sonnet 116 with a recollection of "The Solem- 
nization of Matrimony" in the Prayer Book; and none of its terms enforces 
such a recollection as do "marriage" and "impediments" in 116. More to 
the present point, the terms 71 shares with the Prayer Book are much less 
dense as a system and much less suggestive individually than terms such as 
"charter," "bonds," "patent," and "judgment" occurring in 87. The poet 
has used these terms in 71, moreover, in ways that do not prompt-indeed, 
that dampen-any recollection of Christian discourse or Christian hope. 
We can hardly recall the priest's ceremoniaI readiness to "rehearse the 
articles of our faith" or his reliance on "our heavenly father's hand" or his 
vision of "world without end" from the present deployments of 
"rehearse," "hand," and "world." Or consider the inverted phrase, "with 
vilest worms to dwell": it does not allow even a flickering recollection of the 
Christian promise that the righteous will "dwell with [God] in life everlast- 
ing," any more than the poet's reference to his own "poor name" recalls 
"the name of the Father." The only term, finally, that unmistakably refers 
to  the services of organized Christianity, "bell," clearly locates the present 
imaginative exercise outside the church. 
The term "perhaps" in the present context brings to mind a quite 
different personal possibility from that which is emphasized in Christian 
teaching, a possibility that emerges as a reader compares the when clauses 
of this poem, in the second of which "perhaps" occurs, with its $clauses. 
Doing so reveals that the death of the poet, that is, his eventual dwelling 
with worms, is certain; whereas the friend's perusal of these lines is not. The 
poet cannot be sure, one infers, that the friend will ever bother to look upon 
these memorials of his love. This uncertainty generates another: it may be, 
"perhaps," that the friend will take the poet's advice before the poet is 
compounded with clay,19 that he will give up rehearsing the poet's "poor 
name" while the poet is still alive. His affection may "decay," not in 
elegant synchronization with the poet's life, but more quickly. The advice 
voiced in line 12 may not constitute a social courtesy, then, but a personal 
plea: it is, after all, as Sonnet 73 teaches, contrary to the development of 
sincere human affection. 
Sonnet 71 is thus a tissue of explicit arguments and implicit contradic- 
tions, a profoundly articulated conflict between two incommensurable 
realms of human life. But why, it must be asked, if 71 is so profound-and 
in so similar a way-do I judge it less excellent than 87? I do so because of 
the diction of 87, that great wealth of terms permeated with the practices of 
institutional legality, which allowed the poet to develop the conflict between 
love and law with remarkable precision and intensity and to conclude it with 
a climactic reference at once surprising and inevitable. 
Each actually and, as the poem develops, each possibly legal term in 87 
provides a skirmish in the conflict between personal and legal values. Not 
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only does a pun like "bonds" engage the contending motives; but 
"estimate" and "determinate" also, although they are immediately 
relevant to dispositions of property, suggest personal dispositions too; and 
such terms as "matter," "cause," and "worth," although primarily 
personal in value, add weights to the legal scale. Thus the conflict between 
legal and personal motives, while being drawn discursively through the 
three quatrains of 87, intersects several points of special illumination. Not 
all of these terms have kept their legalistic meanings: although "charter" 
(partly because of the Great Charter) and "bonds" and "determinate" still 
maintain their edge, "hold" has weakened along with the practices and 
memories of feudalism, and "patent" has been re-shaped by our recent 
hanker for inventions. But the general pattern of legal usage, partly because 
it has been worked into 87 with such energy, stands as the sign of a per- 
sistent cultural practice among English-speaking people, an institution the 
forms and tendencies of which have been maintained, essentially the same, 
through the years. The practices of polite society, on the other hand, 
lacking such a monument in our language and so definite a presence in our 
sensibilities, Shakespeare could not impress on 71 with a comparable sharp- 
ness or to a comparable depth. He used a number of appropriate terms, as 
we have seen: "mourn," "world," "look," "surly ," "rehearse," 
"mock." But none of these has the suggestive edge of the legal language in 
87. "Mourn" does shade away from the personal sincerity of "woe," no 
doubt; but so much mourning is sincere-so many an inky cloak covers a 
suffering heart-that a reader must proceed, aided by the gradually 
evident repetitions and the developing tissue of the argument, t o  assemble 
the opposed realms of Sonnet 71 and to participate in Shakespeare's 
discrimination between themSz0 His account of this opposition is, by 
comparison with that presented in 87, diffuse; and his position, at least 
until the couplet, is tenuous. 
With the mockery of "the wise worId," 71 crystallizes quite 
beautifully; but even this intense and luminous moment is inferior to the 
corresponding moment in 87. The distinctively legal terminology 
represented, as we have seen, a distinctive legal structure, a pyramidal 
structure that would have been even more apparent to Elizabethan readers 
than to us, and implied a supreme legal presence, a king, in whom justice 
and equity ultimately focused. This made it possible for Shakespeare to end 
87 in a way that was fresh, since the royal presence was barely hinted in the 
first twelve lines, and yet immediately relevant. The term "mock" in the 
couplet of 71 is also both new and clear; but Shakespeare had used other 
necessary terms, "look" and "world," before. In the first quatrain he twice 
employed "world," first deriving from it an obvious social significance and 
then, while observing its broader meaning, working it into a conventional 
social pose. This close-coupled repetition of the term both inflated the first 
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quatrain and lowered the shock, the force, of "world" as it appears in the 
couplet. But it was no doubt necessary to gloss this crucial term as the poet 
has done: even in the couplet, he has had to modify it as "the wise world" 
to establish its social meaning. He has successfully done so, it seems to me; 
and the reader greets the supposed mockery of society at the end of 71 with 
a sense of its literary propriety and of the coherence of the whole sonnet. 
But 87 is intensely vivid right from its opening paradox; and its conclusion 
is one of the great moments in English poetry. 
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